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Abstract: At present, safety management work is based on incident statistics, accident 
investigation, incident management. However, traditional incident analysis usually only focuses 
on surface phenomena. There are still many deep-seated reasons in incident management, so it is 
necessary to conduct in-depth studies of data in terms of incidents. While the main advantages of 
DMAIC process improvement methodology in performance, it can find the key factor which 
results in the defect in depth. To reduce the defect by control the key factor in an acceptable 
level, this thesis reports the application of DMAIC in the safety area and proposes a scheme to 
improve incident management. This thesis will build DMAIC model, Define, Measure, Analyze, 
Improve, and Control the whole process. By using the Pareto diagram, combined Analytic 
Hierarchy process (AHP), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), the results show the influence degree 
of the basic incidents of the three accident types on the overall objective. According to the 
results, specific improvement plans are put forward for the key factors. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported on December 17, 2019, there 
were 5,250 fatal workplace injuries in the US in 2018, up 2% from 5,147 in 2017. Additionally, 
there were 3,552 fatal accidents at work in the European Union during 2017 (Eurostat, 2020). 
Occupational injuries and fatalities take an even more significant toll in lower middle-income 
countries. 
Safety issues are related to the development of enterprises and also to the health of 
employees' families. Furthermore, safety is concerned with various hazards that may result in 
accidents causing harm to people, property and the environment. In the safety field, the risk is 
typically defined as the "likelihood and severity of hazardous events." Since safety is directly 
related to risk, risk measurement methods and risk reduction techniques are becoming more 
essential to be implemented in the work-place to ensure the safety of employees, and maintain a 
smooth production process. Without incident management, it is difficult to fully assess the risks in 
a given scenario to further prevent workplace accidents. However, traditional incident analysis 
usually only focuses on surface phenomena. But, there are still a lot of deep-seated reasons in 
incident management, so it is necessary to conduct in-depth studies of data in terms of incidents.  
If a company can control the probability of accidents within an acceptable range, then it 
can effectively control the occurrence of them. Thus, this research takes place at a manufacturing 
facility (K-Company), and the aim is to provide a systematic method for analyzing and improving 
incident management in the manufacturing process. The specific location and name of the facility 
are omitted from this research in order to avoid a negative impact and evaluation of K-Company 
from the public and consumers due to the mismanagement of the accident. The company in 
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question is a comprehensive industrial group integrating high-end oil equipment and 
manufacturing oilfield integration, which is mainly engaged in oil drilling and other parts of the 
industry's machinery manufacturing. With more than 8,000 employees, K-Company is an oil and 
gas equipment production and service provider with its headquarters. In recent years, frequent 
company accidents have had a great impact on employees' life, safety, and company property. 
1.2 Purpose of Research 
The purpose of this thesis is to apply the DMAIC process improvement methodology in 
the Safety field to propose a scheme to improve the incident management of the manufacturing 
process. This thesis will build a DMAIC model, which stands for Define, Measure, Analyze, 
Improve, and Control within the whole process. Additionally, this thesis also aims to identify the 
key factors responsible for incident management by using a Pareto Chart and a combination of 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), as well as the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to provide the 
potential for a structured decision method for incident management. The results of this study are 
likely to be applied to successfully further safety management. The reason being is that, as a highly 
reliable analysis method, DMAIC, FTA, as well as AHP combined, can all be widely used in the 
industrial field. 
1.3 Objectives of Research 
The following points are the main objectives of this research. 
• Create a DMAIC improvement program for incident management. 
• Identify the key factors responsible for incident management by using the Pareto 
Chart. 
• Analyze the root causes of accidents by FTA and incident improvement priorities 
through the AHP. 
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1.4 Significance of Research 
In the past, the word "accident" was often used to refer to an unplanned, unwanted event, 
and to many people, an "accident" is a random, unavoidable event. However, almost all worksite 
deaths, injuries, and illnesses are preventable. OSHA recommends the use of the term "incident" 
for investigation. Therefore, incident management is crucial regardless of business, size, or 
industry. Without effective incident management, a company will put its employees, customers, 
brand reputation, and revenues at risk by failing to take appropriate safety measures and 
precautions. 
This thesis provides a systematic method for the improvement of incident management to 
find out the underlying or root causes of accidents in the manufacturing process, to reduce or 
eliminate the serious consequences of similar incidents in the future. Additionally, analysis of 
incidents during the production process with DMAIC process improvement methodology provides 
employers and workers with the opportunity to identify hazards in their operations and defects in 
safety and health programs. Most importantly, it enables employers and workers to identify and 
implement the corrective actions necessary to prevent future accidents.  
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations 
Most safety activities are reactive and not proactive. Many organizations wait for losses to 
occur before taking steps to prevent a recurrence. Near miss incidents often precede loss producing 
incidents but are largely ignored because nothing (no injury, damage or loss) occurred. Employees 
are not encouraged to report these close calls as there has been no disruption or loss in the form of 
injuries or property damage. This could lead to deviations in the data collection phase from the 
basic incidents that occur. 
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1.6 Definition of Terms 
Incident is referred to as a work-related incident(s) in which an injury or ill health (regardless of 
severity) or fatality occurred or could have occurred. (OHSAS 18001, 2007) 
Accident is an unplanned and uncontrolled incident in which the action or reaction of an object, 
substance, person or radiation results in personal injury or the probability thereof. (Bird, F., 
Germain, G.,1966.) 
DMAIC is a data-driven quality strategy used to improve processes. It is an integral 
part of a Six Sigma initiative, but in general can be implemented as a standalone quality 
improvement procedure or as part of other process improvement initiatives such as lean. (Connie 
M. Borror, 2009) 
Near Miss is an incident in which no property was damaged and no personal injury was sustained, 
but where, given a slight shift in time or position, damage or injury easily could have occurred. 
Near misses also may be referred to as close calls, near accidents, accident precursors, injury-free 
incidents, and in the case of moving objects, near collisions. 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top-down, deductive failure analysis in which an undesired state of 
a system is analyzed using Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-level incidents.  Example 
is shown in figure 1. This analysis method is mainly used in safety engineering and reliability 
engineering to understand how systems can fail to identify the best ways to reduce risk and to 
determine (or get a feeling for) incident rates of a safety accident or a particular system level 
(functional) failure.  
Analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is a structured technique for organizing and 
analyzing complex decisions based on mathematics and psychology. It represents an accurate 
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approach for quantifying the weights of decision criteria. Individual experts' experiences are 
utilized to estimate the relative magnitudes of factors through pairwise comparisons. 
  
Figure 1. Fault tree for two lights in a room. 
Retrieve from: https://www.intechopen.com/books/concise-reliability-for-engineers/fault-tree-
analysis-and-reliability-block-diagrams 
Pareto Chart is a type of bar chart in which the various factors that contribute to an overall effect 
are arranged in order according to the magnitude of their effect. The bars are arranged in 
descending order of height from left to right. This means the categories represented by the tall 
bars on the left are relatively more significant than those on the right. Example is shown in figure 
2. 
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Figure 2: sample Pareto diagram. Retrieved from: Pareto Chart, Minnesota Department of 
Health from http://www.health.state.mn.us/2016   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 DMAIC  
The DMAIC model systematically helps organizations solve problems and improve 
processes by defining, measuring, analyzing, improving, and controlling five interrelated phases. 
Dale et al. (2007) briefly described the DMAIC phase as follows: 
Define – this stage within the DMAIC process involves defining the team's role, project 
scope and boundary, customer requirements and expectations and the goals of selected projects 
(Gijo; Scaria; Antony, 2011). 
Measure – this phase of measurement involves the selection of measurement factors that 
need to be improved (Omachonu; Ross, 2004), and provides a structure to evaluate current 
performance, as well as evaluate, compare, and monitor subsequent improvements and their 
capabilities (Stamatis, 2004). 
Analyze – the focus of this analysis phase is to identify the root cause of the problem 
(defect) (Omachonu; Ross, 2004), understanding why defects have occurred, and comparing and 
prioritizing opportunities to promote improvement (Adams; Gupta. Wilson JR.2003). 
Improve – improve this step by focusing on experimental and statistical techniques that 
may result in improved reduction of quality problems or defects (Omachonu; Ross, 2004).  
Control – finally, the final stage in the DMAIC process ensures the persistence of 
improvement (Omachonu; Ross, 2004), This continuous performance is monitored. Process 
improvement is also documented and institutionalized. 
DMAIC is similar to Deming's continuous learning and process improvement model, Plan-
do-check-act (PDCA) (Deming, 1993). In the Six Sigma approach, DMAIC works by providing a 
structured approach to solving business problems. 
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Pyzdek (2003) believes that DMAIC is a learning model. Although it focuses on 
performing improvement activities, it emphasizes the collection and analysis of data before 
performing any improvement activities. This provides a platform for DMAIC users to make 
decisions and takes actions based on real and scientific facts rather than experience and knowledge, 
as is the case in many organizations, small and medium enterprises (Garza-Reyes, et al. 2010). 
2.2 Fault Tree Analysis  
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was originally developed by H.A. Watson of Bell 
Telephone Lab, originally commissioned by the U.S. Air Force's 526th ICBM System Group to 
evaluate the launch control system for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (Ericson, 
Clifton, 1999). After that, FTA becomes a tool for reliability analysis. Launch control safety 
studies for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were first published in 1962 using fault tree 
analysis technology, followed by Boeing and Avco, which began using fault tree analysis in the 
Minuteman II System in 1963-64. The techniques of fault tree analysis were widely reported at the 
1965 Systems Safety Symposium in Seattle, sponsored by Boeing and the University of 
Washington. Boeing began applying fault tree analysis to the design of civil aircraft in 1966 
(Hixenbaugh, A. F.,1968). In 1976, the U.S. Army Equipment Command incorporated FTA into 
the Engineering Design Manual for reliability design (Evans, Ralph A, 1976).  
In the early days of the Apollo program, people asked about the possibility of successfully 
sending astronauts to the moon and returning them safely to Earth. Some risk or reliability 
calculation has been made, and the result is an unacceptably low probability of mission success. 
This result precluded further quantitative risk or reliability analysis by NASA prior to the 1986 
Challenger accident. Instead, NASA decided to rely on failure mode and impact analysis (FMEA) 
and other qualitative methods for system safety assessments. After the Challenger accident, people 
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recognized the importance of structural risk assessment (PRA) and FTA in system risk and 
reliability analysis and began to be applied in NASA. Currently, FTA is considered as one of the 
most important systems reliability and safety analysis technologies. 
In addition, in order to assess and analyze risks, the FTA approach is most appropriate 
because of its outstanding characteristics in identifying risk issues. It is worth noting that FTA is 
a documented method used to determine the underlying causes of a given undesired incident. It 
involves the construction of the error tree and starts with a top-level incident (Vesely et al., 1981).  
2.3 Analytic Hierarchy Process  
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a structured technique based on mathematics and 
psychology to organize and analyze complex decisions. It was developed in the 1970s by Thomas 
L. Saaty, who, in collaboration with Ernest Forman, developed Expert Choice in 1983, and has 
been extensively studied and refined since then. It represents a method to accurately quantify the 
weight of decision criteria. The experience of individual experts estimates the relative size of 
factors by pairwise comparison (Saaty TL., 2008). 
AHP has been applied to many problem situations; Selection of competitive schemes, 
allocation and prediction of scarce resources in the multi-objective environment. Although AHP 
has broad applicability, its axiomatic basis carefully limits the scope of the problem environment 
(Saaty TL., 2008). It is based on the clearly defined mathematical structure of a consistent matrix 
and its associated right eigenvector ability to produce true or approximate weights. 
Law et al. (2006) used the hierarchical decision Model (AHP) to assess the priority of 
safety management elements in Hong Kong manufacturing enterprises. In this model, a self-
regulating system is proposed to realize the safety characteristics. De Felice et al., in 2016, 
proposed a comprehensive approach AHP to quantify the performance and effectiveness of risk 
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management to assess emergency alternatives. Prasad et al., (2013) proposed a hierarchical 
decision model for the Indian construction industry OHSAS 18001 to assess the priority of 
elements. Infrastructure is divided into transportation, urban infrastructure and public utilities. 
Hsu and Wang(2011) defined a complete safety management system in the plan. The study 
identified 43 key factors and 15 cultural dimensions of safety. AHP determines the weights 
between cultural dimensions. Aminbakhsh et al. (2013) used the AHP model to manage risk 
priorities in the construction industry. The model considers the cost of accidents and determines 
the appropriate investment for accident prevention. Choices are made through a decision hierarchy 
approach. Chang and Lian(2009), developed a safety assessment model for paint production plant 
processes. The AHP model defines the weights of different design attributes. The model shows 
that companies with ISO 18001 certification have more effective risk management. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 DMAIC 
DMAIC process improvement methodology is through the analysis of the process, with the 
method of data statistics to find out the process in need of improvement, project or opportunity as 
the research is to optimize the incident management process through the DMAIC method to reduce 
the occurrence of accidents. Following the five steps of DMAIC to create a model for incident 
management. The DMAIC roadmap is shown in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: DMAIC Roadmap 
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Define — In the first stage, through the analysis of multiple accident situations of K-
Company within a recent timespan of five years, the Pareto diagram of the various accidents causes 
was obtained by using Minitab, as well as analysis to determine the production process flow of the 
enterprise in question. The aim is to successfully identify the key factors responsible for accidents.  
Measure — The second phase measures the actual state of the current project. It includes 
a description of defined objectives, quantification, collection of incident-related data, and 
verification of measurement systems. Then, the scope of factors must be exposed that affect the 
target and the data in the production process will be measured and counted. 
Analyze — In the third stage, the data that was collected during the measurement stage 
will be analyzed and ranked according to the degree of influence of each factor on the project's 
objectives. That is, the degree of contribution to the project objectives, to determine the most 
critical influencing factors. Then, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) must be conducted on the root causes 
of the accidents. Last but not least, the incident improvement priorities will be determined through 
the usage of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP).  
Improve — In the fourth stage, improving control measures should give priority to solving 
the basic incident with a high contribution rate. Then, the optimization plan for key factors will be 
formulated. The improvement of the key factors is mainly through the combination of technical 
education and management to complete the technical safety countermeasures to focus on solving 
the problem of equipment failures, while safety education and safety management mainly focus 
on solving the problem of human errors. 
Control — the fifth stage, the improvement process will be developed to ensure that the 
project will be improved and effectively implemented and maintained in the future. 
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3.2 Fault Tree Analysis 
The analysis process of this study is to first determine the types of accidents that can occur 
in the production process of K-Company. This is done mainly through the analysis of the 
production technology, production environment, production equipment, and data that was 
collected from the enterprise. 
The second is to find the intermediate level incidents and the basic level incidents that lead 
to the top accident. The fault tree quantitative analysis of criticality can be from the perspective of 
sensitivity, and its probability of occurrence of double reflect fundamental changes to the top 
incidents that can happen. This article uses the influence of criticality to represent human error and 
equipment failures for the contribution of the top incident, and to analyze the possible accident 
risks in the production process of enterprises, and to break down the causes that may lead to 
accident risks. Example of fault tree analysis is shown in figure 4. 
The basic process is as follows:  
1.) The possible accidents of the manufacturing process will be analyzed. 
2.) Determine the events and conditions (i.e., intermediate events) that most directly lead 
to the top event. 
3.)  The direct and indirect causes of accidents are found; AND logical symbols such as 
OR Gate, AND Gate, Exclusive OR Gate, Priority AND gate are used to construct the 
logical relationship diagram between product accidents and causes.  
4.) Draw the fault tree according to the previously mentioned analysis. (see Figure 3). 
5.) Study the fault tree model and the list of minimal cut sets to identify potentially 
important dependencies among events. 
14 
 
 
 
6.) The logical diagram is analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively to identify the 
probability of top event, basic incident importance and criticality. Then, to find out the 
specific measures to control accidents so as to improve the reliability or safety of the 
system.  
Suppose that a fault tree has K minimum cut sets: 𝐸1, 𝐸2, …, 𝐸𝑟, 𝐸𝑘, and the accident tree 
is represented by the equivalent tree of its minimum cut set. At this point, the occurrence 
probability of the top event is equal to the union of the minimum cut sets.  
𝑃(𝑇) = ∑  ∏ 𝑞𝑖𝑋𝑖∈𝐸𝑟
𝑘
𝑟=1 −  ∑ ∏ 𝑞𝑖𝑋𝑖∈𝐸𝑟  1≤𝑟<𝑠≤𝑘 + ⋯ + (−1)
𝑘−1 ∏ 𝑞𝑖
𝑘
𝑟=1
𝑋𝑖∈𝐸𝑟
        Equation 1 
r, s, t -- the ordinal number of the minimum cut-set, r < s < t. 
𝑖 -- the sequence number of the basic event. 
k -- minimum cut-set number. 
1 ≤ 𝑟 < 𝑠 ≤ 𝑘  -- The combination order of the two minimum cut-sets r and s in k 
minimum cut-sets; 
𝑋𝑖 ∈ 𝐸𝑟-- the 𝑖 basic event belonging to the minimum cut-set; 
The probability importance degree of a basic event refers to the rate of change of the 
probability of occurrence of the top event to the probability of occurrence of the basic event. The 
probability importance degree of a certain basic event 𝑖 is calculated as follows:  
𝐼𝑔(𝑖) =  
𝜕𝑃(𝑇)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
                                                 Equation 2 
Where 𝐼𝑔(𝑖) is probability importance coefficient of the basic event 𝑖, 𝑃(𝑇) is probability 
of occurrence of top event, 𝑞𝑖  is probability of basic event 𝑖. 
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The critical importance degree refers to the ratio of the relative rate of change of the 
probability of occurrence of a basic event to that of the probability of occurrence of the top event 
to represent the importance degree of the basic event. The calculation formula of a basic event 𝑖 
is:  
𝐼𝑐(𝑖) =  lim
∆𝑞𝑖→0
(
∆𝑃(𝑇)/𝑃(𝑇)
∆𝑞𝑖/𝑞𝑖
)
 
=  
𝑞𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)
lim
∆𝑞𝑖→0
(
∆𝑃(𝑇)
∆𝑞𝑖
)
 
= 𝐼𝑔(𝑖) ∗  
𝑞𝑖
𝑃(𝑇)
           Equation 1 
Where 𝐼𝑐(𝑖) is key importance coefficient of basic event 𝑖.  
 
Figure 4: Example of Fault Tree Analysis  
                        T 
        K1               K3 
X1 X2 
X6 X7 
            K2      
X5 X3 X4                  K4  
Top incident 
Link contributors (OR, AND) 
 
Second level 
 
First level 
 
Basic incident  
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3.3 Analytic Hierarchy Process 
For an accident risk, it is usually described by the possibility and severity of an accident. 
In the analysis process of this thesis, the index of controllability is added. Controllability refers to 
the ability of an enterprise to control possible accidents, that is, the ability of an enterprise to bear 
the possibility and severity of accidents.  
To establish the AHP evaluation model (Figure 5), AHP algorithm is used to determine the 
relative weight of top incidents, determine the priority, and multiply the criticality of basic 
incidents and the relative priority weight of accident type to represent the contribution degree, to 
define the impact degree of basic incidents on the overall target. 
 In the same way, a comprehensive assessment is provided. AHP uses an absolute value 
scale from 1 to 9 to make pairwise comparisons. The scale is explained in table 3. 
Figure 5: Example of AHP evaluation model 
Accident 1  |𝐶1                                       Accident 2  |𝐶2                                 Accident 3 | 𝐶3   
Probability | 𝐵1                 Severity | 𝐵2 Controllability | 𝐵3 
Incident management |A 
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Table 1. Example of three alternative (B1, B2, B3) pairwise comparison matrices for criterion A. 
Table 2. The analytic hierarchy process comparison scale. 
Absolute value Definition 
1 Equal importance 
3 Moderate importance of one over another 
5 Strong or essential importance of one over another 
7 Very strong or demonstrated importance of one over another 
9 Extreme importance of one over another 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values 
Reciprocals Reciprocals for inverse comparison 
The consistency ratio (CR) measure is also used in AHP to check the consistency of 
judgment. In the process of pair comparison, the decision makers tend to produce inconsistencies 
due to negligence or excessive judgment. A CR of 0.1 is considered an acceptable upper limit. If 
CR is found to be greater than 0.1, the decision maker need to re-evaluate their judgment in a 
pairwise comparison matrix until an acceptable ratio (<0.1) is finally reached. 
A B1 B2 B3 Priority vector 
B1 1 B1/B2 B1/B3 % 
B2 B2/B1 1 B2/B3 % 
B3 B3/B1 B3/B2 1 % 
18 
 
 
 
When the CR value is obtained, the consistency index (CI) number is used as the 
consistency measure.CI is the degree of deviation or consistency calculated using the following 
formula 
𝐶𝐼(𝑘)=( λ𝑚𝑎𝑥-n)/(n-1)                              Equation 4 
Where λ𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the principle (maximum) eigenvalue obtained by summation of the product 
of each element of the eigenvector and the sum of each column of the reciprocal matrix, and n is 
the number of comparisons.CI is used to compare it to an appropriate word. An appropriate CI is 
called the random consistency index (RI). The average RI is shown in Table 4. The consistency 
ratio is the comparison between CI and RI, or expressed by the formula 
CR= CI/ RI                                  Equation 5 
If CR ≤ 0.10, the inconsistency is acceptable, otherwise, the subjective judgment is to be 
revised. 
Table 3. Random consistency index values for n from 1 to 10. 
n 1 2 3.00 4.0 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10 
RI 0 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 
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Chapter 4: Findings 
4.1 Data Collection 
The course of this research takes place at a manufacturing facility, that will be referred to 
as K-Company for confidentiality purposes. K-Company is a comprehensive industrial group 
incorporating oil equipment and manufacturing oilfield integration, which is also mainly engaged 
in oil drilling and other parts of the industry's machinery manufacturing. The data was obtained 
from accident reports generated over the last five years.  
The data includes: 
• Collected information on various hazards and risks. While identifying the root 
cause and direct cause of a large number of accidents through all relevant reports 
and statistics. 
• Identified the production process, analyzed and collected the basic and intermediate 
events that lead to accidents, and then uses them for the qualitative analysis of the 
fault tree. 
• Collected the probability of the basic event for the quantitative analysis of the fault 
tree. The probability of occurrence of basic events includes the probability of failure 
of the unit (component) of the system, the probability of human error, etc. The 
company uses the frequency of basic events under certain conditions and time to 
represent the probability value of basic events. 
• It also is important to collect all information about any kind of near misses or nearby 
accidents. Though these near misses do not have a real impact, they are just as 
valuable a source of information as real accidents and it is important to derive the 
right lessons from them. 
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4.2 Analysis 
4.2.1 DMAIC - Define 
In the past five years, there have been a total of 16 accidents in K-Company, causing 
property losses and endangering the lives and health of employees. It also has a negative impact 
on the company's reputation and growth prospects. Therefore, the goal of this thesis was to find 
out the key factors affecting accidents and propose specific improvement schemes, to provide 
employers and workers with the opportunity to identify risks in their operations and defects in 
safety and health programs. 
Table 4：Incidents type in 2015-2019 
Year Mechanical 
Injury 
Lifting 
Injury 
Fire Falls Traffic 
Accidents 
Near-Miss 
2015 1 0 0 0 0 4 
2016 2 1 0 1 0 2 
2017 3 0 1 0 0 3 
2018 3 1 1 0 0 2 
2019 2 0 0 0 1 2 
Total 11 2 2 1 1 13 
It can be seen from the data that 15 accidents occurred in the manufacturing process. K-
company has to use a large number of mechanical equipment in the production process, so there 
is a greater risk of mechanical injury during the course of production. In addition, in the process 
of heat treatment, because the quenching medium is usually flammable oil and there are many 
high-temperature operations throughout such as an open flame, but not limited to the failure of a 
circulating cooling system or even an electrostatic spark can most certainly be the main hazard 
sources of fire.  
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The main production processes flow chart of the enterprise is shown in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Process flow chart of K company. 
4.2.2 DMAIC - Measure 
Statistics of the company's safety incidents from 2015 to 2019 are shown in Figure 7. As 
can be seen from the figure, in the past five years, incident types such as mechanical injury, fire, 
and lifting accidents have been the most frequent. 
Through the statistical analysis of the accidents of the enterprise, the Pareto Diagram of 
the accidents is obtained by Minitab17. 
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Figure 7. Pareto Chart of accidents in K-Company in 2015-2019. 
During the definition phase, opportunities and goals for improvement are identified. 
Combined with the production process of the enterprise, the data acquisition is mainly focused on 
the three processes of heat treatment, production and lifting used in the manufacturing process. In 
these three processes, fire accidents, mechanical injury accidents, and lifting accidents are dealt 
with respectively.  
4.2.3 DMAIC - Analysis 
The main mechanical processing equipment involved in the company's production process 
includes utilizing cutting machines, plate cutting machines, lathes, planers, milling machines, 
presses, etc., and the main ways of mechanical injury caused by such machinery include clamping, 
collision, shearing, skewing, grinding, cutting, stabbing, etc. 
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The causes of mechanical injury accidents mainly occur due to the operators' failure to 
operate mechanical equipment in accordance with operating procedures, the workers' failure to 
wear labor protection articles in accordance with regulations, and their weak sense of self-
protection. All kinds of mechanical motions and actions can present hazards to workers. These 
may include movement of rotating parts, reciprocating arms, moving belts, meshing gears, cutting 
teeth, and any impacting or shearing parts. These different types of dangerous mechanical motions 
and actions are fundamental in almost all different combinations of machines, and identifying them 
is the first step in protecting workers from the dangers they present. 
Table 5. Machinery - Dangerous parts of machinery 
Rank Motions Hazards 
1 Still Sharp edges and rough surfaces for tools and equipment 
Protrusion of mechanical parts 
2 Transverse moving Longitudinal movement of mechanical parts 
The part of a machine that moves laterally 
A raised mechanical part in a straight line of motion 
The combination of the moving part and the stationary 
part 
3 Rotating Mechanical part with  rotary motion 
Danger between two mechanical parts involved in 
rotating motion 
A swinging mechanical part 
A tool in rotary motion 
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4 Reciprocating A mechanical combination of rotary motion and rotary 
motion 
A mechanical combination of linear motion and rotary 
motion 
5 Transmission apparatus A machine throws out Lathe tool 
A machine throws out iron filings, work pieces 
The fault tree analysis of mechanical injuries is shown in the figure 8. 
Using Boolean algebra method to simplify the fault tree, we can get the minimum cut set 
of the fault tree: 
{M2, M3, M1}, {M9}, {M14, M15}, {M1, M5}, {M11}, {M18, M17}, {M12}, {M13}, 
{M6, M8}, {M5, M7}, {M5, M8}, {M6, M7}, {M9}, {M16, M7}, {M15}, {M1, M2, M4}, {M19, 
M17}. 
Table 6. Summary of the basic incidents of mechanical injury. 
Name Data (Probability) Description 
M1 0.065 The machine whirled the iron filings out 
M2 0.015 Failure of mechanical protective cover 
M3 0.013 No work glasses 
M4 0.005 Glasses damaged 
M5 0.015 Unreasonable adjustment of tool angle 
M6 0.063 Iron filings breaker failure 
M7 0.003 No iron filings removal tools 
M8 0.006 No tools were used 
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M9 0.006 Work with gloves 
M10 0.005 The sleeves are not tied well 
M11 0.023 Clean up before stopping the lathe 
M12 0.017 Pick up before stopping the lathe 
M13 0.008 Measure before stopping the lathe 
M14 0.071 The work-piece is placed on the lathe surface 
M15 0.003 Unstable placement of work-piece 
M16 0.006 Operator failed to spot check 
M17 0.052 Claw damage 
M18 0.036 Rack damage 
M19 0.009 Set speed too high 
According to formula, the probability of the occurrence of top accident is calculated as 
follows:     
𝑃(𝑇) = ∑  ∏ 𝑞𝑖𝑀𝑖∈𝐸𝑟
𝑘
𝑟=1 −  ∑ ∏ 𝑞𝑖𝑀𝑖∈𝐸𝑟  1≤𝑟<𝑠≤𝑘 + ⋯ + (−1)
𝑘−1 ∏ 𝑞𝑖
𝑘
𝑟=1
𝑀𝑖∈𝐸𝑟
     Equation 1 
𝑃(𝑇) = 0.07268 
According to the formula, the structural importance degree of each basic incident is 
calculated: 
𝐼𝑔(𝑖) =  
𝜕𝑃(𝑇)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
 
Equation 2 
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Table 7. Structural importance of the basic incidents of mechanical injury. 
Name Structural Importance 
M1 0.01092 
M2 0.00109 
M3 0.00089 
M4 0.00095 
M5 0.06459 
M6 0.00894 
M7 0.01978 
M8 0.07753 
M9 0.05751 
M10 0.93290 
M11 0.32199 
M12 0.23799 
M13 0.11199 
M14 0.99398 
M15 0.03280 
M16 0.07057 
M17 0.08747 
M18 0.00596 
M19 0.00457 
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Figure 8. Mechanical injury fault tree. 
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Calculate the criticality importance of each basic event. 
𝐼𝑐(𝑖) =  lim
∆𝑞𝑖→0
(
∆𝑃(𝑇)/𝑃(𝑇)
∆𝑞𝑖/𝑞𝑖
)
 
=  
𝑞𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)
lim
∆𝑞𝑖→0
(
∆𝑃(𝑇)
∆𝑞𝑖
)
 
= 𝐼𝑔(𝑖) ∗  
𝑞𝑖
𝑃(𝑇)
         Equation 3 
Table 8. Criticality importance of the basic incidents of mechanical injury. 
Name Criticality Importance 
M1 0.00911 
M2 0.00022 
M3 0.00015 
M4 0.00006 
M5 0.00889 
M6 0.00184 
M7 0.00775 
M8 0.00319 
M9 0.00640 
M10 0.07701 
M11 0.06838 
M12 0.31452 
M13 0.23247 
M14 0.10939 
M15 0.03204 
M16 0.03204 
M17 0.00722 
M18 0.00427 
M19 0.00295 
𝐼c (12) > 𝐼c (13) > 𝐼c (14) > 𝐼c (10) > 𝐼c (11) > 𝐼c (15) > 𝐼c (16) > 𝐼c (1) > 𝐼c (5) > 𝐼c (7) > 𝐼c 
(17) >𝐼c (9) > 𝐼c (18) > 𝐼c (8) > 𝐼c (19) > 𝐼c (6) > 𝐼c (2) > 𝐼c (3) > 𝐼c (4) 
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When the heating temperature reaches 1050 -1100 ℃, the heat preservation coefficient is 
0.8 -1.2min/mm. Then the work-piece is quickly immersed in the quenching medium (mixed oil), 
and the depth of the work-piece immersed in the coolant should be greater than 50 mm (to avoid 
ignition). After cooling and cleaning, tempering is carried out at 500 ℃, and the tempering time 
depends on the process requirements as shown in figure 9. In order to ensure the quenching quality 
and safety, the quenching medium must be continuously cooled. Therefore, the quenching oil pool 
is equipped with a circulating cooling system. 
Some flammable liquids (gasoline, kerosene, and diesel), organic compounds (methanol, 
ethanol, acetylene, propane, butane, acetone) used in heat treatment are inflammable and explosive 
substances. Heat treatment furnaces using gas and liquid fuels often have fire accidents due to 
improper operation. Fire accident tree analysis is carried out for the heat treatment process of the 
company. 
The fault tree analysis of fire accident is shown in the figure 10. 
 
Figure 9. Heat treatment process. 
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 Figure 10. Fire accident fault tree.  
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Using Boolean algebra method to simplify the fault tree, the minimum cut set of the fault 
tree can be obtained: {X6, X10}, {X7, X10}, {X8, X10}, {X9, X11}, {X7, X11}, {X8, X11}, 
{X9, X11}, {X1, X3, X4, X10}, {X8, X11}, {X1, X3, X4, X11}, {X1, X3, X5, X10}, {X1, X3, 
X5, X11}, {X2, X3, X4, X10}, {X2, X3, X4, X11}, {X2, X3, X5, X10}, {X2, X3, X5, X11}. 
 Table 9. Summary of the basic incidents of fire accident. 
Name Data (Probability) Description 
X1 0.019 Circulating cooling system equipment failure 
X2 0.009 Circuit failure of the circulating cooling system 
X3 0.014 Temperature sensor failure 
X4 0.016 Alarm failure 
X5 0.021 Feedback system failure 
X6 0.001 Work clothes with static electricity 
X7 0.05 No anti-static pad 
X8 0.04 Explosion proof electrical appliance failure 
X9 0.023 Using fire in violation of rules and regulations 
X10 0.001 Explosion proof electrical appliance failure 
X11 0.04 Mistakes in the operation of firefighting 
equipment 
According to the formula, the probability of the top event is calculated as 
𝑃(𝑇) = ∑  ∏ 𝑞𝑖𝑋𝑖∈𝐸𝑟
𝑘
𝑟=1 −  ∑ ∏ 𝑞𝑖𝑋𝑖∈𝐸𝑟  1≤𝑟<𝑠≤𝑘 + ⋯ + (−1)
𝑘−1 ∏ 𝑞𝑖
𝑘
𝑟=1
𝑋𝑖∈𝐸𝑟
        Equation 1 
𝑃(𝑇) = 0.0048 
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Calculate the structural importance of each basic event: 
𝐼𝑔(𝑖) =  
𝜕𝑃(𝑇)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
                                               Equation 2 
Table 10. Structural importance of the basic incidents of fire accident. 
Name Structural Importance 
X1 0.000021 
X2 0.000018 
X3 0.000042 
X4 0.000016 
X5 0.000029 
X6 0.049058 
X7 0.042832 
X8 0.040883 
X9 0.039956 
X10 0.109335 
X11 0.113972 
Calculate the criticality importance of each basic event: 
𝐼𝑐(𝑖) =  lim
∆𝑞𝑖→0
(
∆𝑃(𝑇)/𝑃(𝑇)
∆𝑞𝑖/𝑞𝑖
)
 
=  
𝑞𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)
lim
∆𝑞𝑖→0
(
∆𝑃(𝑇)
∆𝑞𝑖
)
 
= 𝐼𝑔(𝑖) ∗  
𝑞𝑖
𝑃(𝑇)
        Equation 3 
Table 11. Criticality importance of the basic incidents of fire accident. 
Name Criticality Importance 
X1 0.000086 
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X2 0.000041 
X3 0.000127 
X4 0.000055 
X5 0.000072 
X6 0.008771 
X7 0.138535 
X8 0.350182 
X9 0.201726 
X10 0.023413 
X11 0.976219 
𝐼c  (11) > 𝐼c  (7) > 𝐼c (8) > 𝐼c  (9) > 𝐼c  (10) > 𝐼c  (6) > 𝐼c  (3) > 𝐼c  (1) > 𝐼c  (5) > 𝐼c  (4) > 𝐼c(2)  
In the production and maintenance of equipment and other processes need to use lifting 
machinery, which may cause lifting injuries. The main tool is a bridge crane, so the analysis of a 
lifting injury accident tree is shown in Figure 11. 
Boolean algebra method is used to simplify the fault tree, and the minimum cut set of the 
fault tree can be obtained: {L1, L11}, {L3, L11}, {L8, L11}, {L8, L11}, {L4, L11}, {L3, L12}, 
{L6, L11}, {L7, L11}, {L9, L11}, {L10, L12}, {L8, L12}, {L4, L12}, {L7, L12}, {L12}, {L9, 
L12}, {L10, L12}, {L2, L12}. 
According to the formula, the probability of the top event is calculated as 
          𝑃(𝑇) = ∑  ∏ 𝑞𝑖𝑋𝑖∈𝐸𝑟
𝑘
𝑟=1 −  ∑ ∏ 𝑞𝑖𝑋𝑖∈𝐸𝑟  1≤𝑟<𝑠≤𝑘 + ⋯ + (−1)
𝑘−1 ∏ 𝑞𝑖
𝑘
𝑟=1
𝑋𝑖∈𝐸𝑟
          Equation1 
𝑃(𝑇) = 0.01403 
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Table 12. Summary of the basic incidents of lifting injury. 
Name Data (Probability) Description 
L1 0.007 Lifting cargo inclines 
L2 0.002 Unskillful operation 
L3 0.060 Controller failure 
L4 0.047 Brake failure 
L5 0.003 Lift the hook when the cargo is not stable 
L6 0.011 The hoisted goods are stacked too high 
L7 0.001 Lifting cargo hits other objects 
L8 0.041 Over-limit use of lifting tools 
L9 0.012 The spreader is broken 
L10 0.005 Impact of the lifted cargo 
L11 0.034 There are other operations in the hoisting 
work area. 
L12 0.033 Non-staff staying in the workplace 
Calculate the structural importance of each basic event. 
𝐼𝑔(𝑖) =  
𝜕𝑃(𝑇)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
                                                 Equation 2 
Table 13. Structural importance of the basic incidents of lifting injury. 
Name Structural Importance 
L1 0.05848 
L2 0.06465 
L3 0.06039 
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L4 0.04731 
L5 0.00413 
L6 0.06465 
L7 0.00588 
L8 0.19706 
L9 0.01892 
L10 0.02694 
L11 0.20303 
L12 0.21335 
Calculate the criticality importance of each basic event. 
𝐼𝑐(𝑖) =  lim
∆𝑞𝑖→0
(
∆𝑃(𝑇)/𝑃(𝑇)
∆𝑞𝑖/𝑞𝑖
)
 
=  
𝑞𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)
lim
∆𝑞𝑖→0
(
∆𝑃(𝑇)
∆𝑞𝑖
)
 
= 𝐼𝑔(𝑖) ∗  
𝑞𝑖
𝑃(𝑇)
        Equation 3 
Table 14. Criticality importance of the basic incidents of lifting injury. 
Name Criticality Importance 
L1 0.02917 
L2 0.00922 
L3 0.25825 
L4 0.21655 
L5 0.01383 
L6 0.05068 
L7 0.00461 
L8 0.18894 
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L9 0.05529 
L10 0.02304 
L11 0.49198 
L12 0.50179 
𝐼c (12) >𝐼c (11) > 𝐼c (3) > 𝐼c (4) > 𝐼c (8) > 𝐼c (9) > 𝐼c (6) > 𝐼c (1) > 𝐼c (10)  > 𝐼c (5) > 𝐼c (2) > 
𝐼c (7) 
 
Figure 11. Lifting injury fault tree. 
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According to the relevant statistical analysis in the previous sections, this thesis establishes 
an AHP evaluation model for the company's accident types: fire, mechanical injury and lifting 
injury, and the evaluation indexes are possibility, severity and controllability. The AHP hierarchy 
model is established. 
 
Figure 12. Incident management AHP hierarchy model 
Firstly, a judgment matrix is established. The judgment matrix of criterion layer B to target 
layer A is, 
𝐸𝐴→𝐵 = [
1 3 5
1/3 1 3
1/5 1/3 1
] 
The judgment matrix of scheme layer C in alignment with gauge layer B is, 
𝐸𝐵1→𝐶 = [
1 3 9
1/3 1 7
1/9 1/3 1
] 
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𝐸𝐵2→𝐶 = [
1 2 7
1/2 1 5
1/7 1/5 1
] 
𝐸𝐵3→𝐶 = [
1 1/3 5
3 1 7
1/5 1/7 1
] 
The second step is to calculate the weight vector and the eigenvector of the judgment 
matrix. By standardizing each column of the A-B judgment matrix, it can be obtained as follows: 
𝑊A→𝐵 = [
0.5883 0.6 0.5556
0.2941 0.3 0.3333
0.1176 0.1 0.1111
] 
The weight vector of the criterion layer to the target layer is, 
𝑊𝐴 =  [0.582, 0.309 , 0.109]
𝑇 
The maximum eigenvalue is, 
λ𝑀𝐴𝑋 =  ∑
𝐴𝑊𝑖
𝑛𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 3.004                      Equation 6 
The consistency test is carried out for the judgment matrix, 
𝐶𝐼 =  
λ𝑀𝐴𝑋−𝑛
𝑛−1
 = 
3.004−3
3−1
 = 0.002                              Equation 4 
By looking up the table, it can be seen that the 4-order matrix RI=0.58,  
𝐶𝑅 =  
𝐶𝐼
𝑅𝐼
 = 
0.002
0.58
 = 0.0034 < 0.1        Equation 5 
Therefore, the consistency test of the judgment matrix is passed. 
So the weight vector of the criterion layer to the target layer is, 
𝑊𝐴 =  [0.582, 0.309 , 0.109]
𝑇 
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The corresponding eigenvectors and consistency test values of the judgment matrix B1, 
B2, and B1 can be obtained as follows: 
𝑊𝐵1 =  [0.655, 0.29 , 0.055]
𝑇, λ𝑀𝐴𝑋 =  
𝐴𝑊𝑖
𝑛𝑊𝑖
 = 3.08, CR = 0.069 < 0.1    Equation 6 
𝑊𝐵2 =  [0.592, 0.333 , 0.075]
𝑇, λ𝑀𝐴𝑋 =  
𝐴𝑊𝑖
𝑛𝑊𝑖
 = 3.014, CR = 0.012 < 0.1 Equation 6 
𝑊𝐵3 =  [0.279, 0.649 , 0.072]
𝑇, λ𝑀𝐴𝑋 =  
𝐴𝑊𝑖
𝑛𝑊𝑖
 = 3.065, CR = 0.055 < 0.1 Equation 6 
Find the resultant weight vector of all judgment matrices. Then the total ranking result of 
the hierarchy is, 
𝑊𝑇 =  𝑊𝐵𝑖 ∗ 𝑊𝐴 = [
0.625 0.481 0.122
0.238 0.405 0.32
0.137 0.114 0.558
] [
0.582
0.309
0.109
] = (0.594, 0.343, 0.063)𝑇 
                                                     Equation 5 
The overall consistency test is passed, so the weight coefficient of mechanical injury, fire 
and lifting injury to the total target is 0.594, 0.343 and 0.063 respectively.  
Table 15. The degree to which basic incidents contribute to safety incident management. 
Accident Type Basic 
Incidents 
Criticality 
Importance 
Priority 
Weight 
Contribution 
Mechanical Injury M1 0.00912  0.594 0.00541  
Mechanical Injury M2 0.00023  0.594 0.00013  
Mechanical Injury M3 0.00016  0.594 0.00009  
Mechanical Injury M4 0.00007  0.594 0.00004  
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Mechanical Injury M5 0.00889  0.594 0.00528  
Mechanical Injury M6 0.00185  0.594 0.00109  
Mechanical Injury M7 0.00775  0.594 0.00461  
Mechanical Injury M8 0.00319 0.594 0.00190 
Mechanical Injury M9 0.00640  0.594 0.00381  
Mechanical Injury M10 0.07701  0.594 0.04574  
Mechanical Injury M11 0.06838  0.594 0.04062  
Mechanical Injury M12 0.31452  0.594 0.18683 
Mechanical Injury M13 0.23247  0.594 0.13809 
Mechanical Injury M14 0.10939  0.594 0.06498 
Mechanical Injury M15 0.03204  0.594 0.01903 
Mechanical Injury M16 0.03204  0.594 0.01903 
Mechanical Injury M17 0.00722  0.594 0.00429 
Mechanical Injury M18 0.00426  0.594 0.00254 
Mechanical Injury M19 0.00295  0.594 0.00175 
Lifting Injury L1 0.02917  0.063  0.00184  
Lifting Injury L2 0.00922  0.063  0.00058  
Lifting Injury L3 0.25825  0.063  0.01627  
Lifting Injury L4 0.21655  0.063  0.01364  
Lifting Injury L5 0.01383  0.063  0.00087  
Lifting Injury L6 0.05068  0.063  0.00319  
Lifting Injury L7 0.00461  0.063  0.00029  
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Lifting Injury L8 0.18890  0.063  0.01191 
Lifting Injury L9 0.05529  0.063  0.00348 
Lifting Injury L10 0.02304  0.063  0.00145 
Lifting Injury L11 0.49198  0.063  0.03099 
Lifting Injury L12 0.50179  0.063  0.03161 
Fire Accident X1 0.00009  0.343 0.00003  
Fire Accident X2 0.00004  0.343 0.00001  
Fire Accident X3 0.00013  0.343 0.00004  
Fire Accident X4 0.00006  0.343 0.00002  
Fire Accident X5 0.00007  0.343 0.00003  
Fire Accident X6 0.00877  0.343 0.00301  
Fire Accident X7 0.13854  0.343 0.04752 
Fire Accident X8 0.35018  0.343 0.12011 
Fire Accident X9 0.20173  0.343 0.06919 
Fire Accident X10 0.02341  0.343 0.00803 
Fire Accident X11 0.97622  0.343 0.33484 
X11 > M12 > M13 > X 8 > X 9 > M14 > X7 > M 10 > M 11 > L 12 > L 11 > M 15 > M16 > L3 > L4 > 
L8 > X10 > L8 > M 1 > M 5 > M 7 > M 17 > M 9 > L 9 > L6 > X6 > M 18 > M8 > L 1 > M 19 > L 10 > 
M 6 > L5 > L2 > L7 > M 2 > M 3 > X3 > M 4 > X1 > X5 > X4 > X2  
42 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Pareto chart of the contribution of each basic incident. 
4.2.4 DMAIC - Improve 
The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to find and propose a solution to improve key factors, 
which is human error and equipment failure. Through the define, measure and analysis of the three 
stages of work, the main reasons affecting the incident management have been identified, and the 
key factors leading to the occurrence of safety production accidents have been found, as well as 
the direction of safety incident management improvement has been made clear. The goal of this 
phase is to find the best solution for controlling these key factors. 
The process of improving the key factors is mainly accomplished through the combination 
of technology, education, and management methods. 
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The safety technology countermeasure focuses on solving the problem of the unsafe state 
of the object. Safety education and safety management methods mainly focus on solving the 
problem of unsafe human behavior. 
The main countermeasures of safety technology include: 
Control energy — The severity after an accident is related to the energy that causes the 
accident. However, the source of energy is mainly the system itself, so the way of controlling 
energy can fundamentally guarantee the safety of the system. 
Risk minimization design — By eliminating the danger through design, even if human 
error or equipment failure will not lead to the accident, which fundamentally guarantees the safety 
of the system. However, such conditions are difficult to achieve, so only as far as possible to 
minimize the risk or to reduce to an acceptable level to ensure the safety of the system. 
Isolation — In some ways, the safety goal is achieved by isolating the dangerous person 
from the equipment and avoiding the transmission of accidents. 
Latching, interlocking, and locking — These three ways can reduce the ability of human 
error to cause accidents and improve the ability to control the consequences of human error. 
Fail-safe — A fail-safe device is a design feature or practice that, in the event of a specific 
type of failure, inherently reacts in a way that causes minimal or no harm to other equipment, the 
environment, or people. 
The alarm — Inform the relevant personnel of the existence of dangers and problems 
requiring attention through prompts so as to take timely and correct measures to avoid accidents. 
The main methods of safety education countermeasures include: 
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Safety awareness — One of the main reasons for bad safety work is a lack of safety 
awareness. Most people think that increasing the safety level will increase investment, but this is 
not the case. In order to improve safety awareness, it is necessary to do a good job in the content 
and form of safety training for the training objects so as to ensure that the content of the training 
is highly targeted, diverse and effective. 
Safety skills — Improve the skill level, analytical ability, emergency judgment and 
handling ability of employees through safety education. 
The main methods of safety management countermeasures.  
Safety inspection — First of all, check the degree of perfection and implementation of the 
existing safety management system. Then, safety environment inspection, identification of 
accident risk in advance, and also checking the implementation of safety improvement measures. 
Specific ways are: general inspection, professional inspection, seasonal inspection.  
Safety review — Mainly for new and expansion projects, according to laws and 
regulations. Safety evaluation includes safety and evaluation, safety status evaluation and safety 
acceptance evaluation, mainly aiming at new projects. The three processes of construction, 
production and project acceptance are analyzed for hazardous factors, identifying hazards and 
proposing control measures. 
According to the actual situation of the company, the improvement control measures 
should give priority to solving the key factors with high contribution rate. Through the 
understanding of the company's production and management process, make the improvement plan. 
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Table 16. Key factors improvement schemes. 
Key Factors Causes Control Measure 
Personnel operating 
fire equipment 
error. 
Insufficient fire protection 
training for personnel. 
1. Emergency action plan detailing what to 
do in the event of a fire. 
2. Fire prevention plan, describing how to 
prevent fire. 
3. Improve the fire training system, phased 
implementation of fire test, fire drill held 
regularly. 
Clean, pick up and 
measure before 
stopping the lathe. 
1. The operator does not 
have enough safety 
awareness. 
2. Lack of protective gear. 
1. Install Man-machine Safety Interlock 
Switches and a light curtain uses a row or 
grid of beams to detect intrusions and stop 
or prevent potentially dangerous operations. 
2. Organize staff to carry out 
comprehensive training. Ensure that all 
employees in this position are able to attend 
and complete all training for their position. 
Electrostatic 1. Friction in work clothes 
creates static electricity. 
2. No barrier device is 
equipped to avoid 
generating loops. 
1. Install anti-static tape and maintain high 
humidity by installing a spray device. 
2. Provide workers with synthetic clothing, 
as natural fibers such as wool, cotton, and 
flax usually produce less static electricity 
than synthetic fibers such as polyester. 
46 
 
 
 
Work with gloves 
on, sleeves not tied 
properly 
Protective clothing and 
equipment can create 
hazards. A protective 
glove or sleeves that can 
become caught between 
rotating parts. 
Comprehensive operator training shall 
include guidance or hands-on training for 
new operators and maintenance or 
installation personnel, when any new or 
changed safety measures are put into use, or 
when workers are assigned to new machines 
or operations. 
There are other 
operations in the 
hoisting work area. 
1. Lift Team did not 
conduct a risk assessment 
of the work area. 
2. The operator does not 
have enough safety 
awareness. 
1. All personnel involved in planning/ 
performing lifting and maintaining lifting 
equipment shall be trained and competent 
for their duties. Training and regular 
assessment are essential means of ensuring 
capacity. 
2. All persons should be kept away from 
overhead loads and potential areas of impact 
The work piece is 
placed on the lathe 
face, or the work 
piece is placed 
unsteadily 
The operator does not have 
enough safety awareness. 
A small tool thrown into a 
cycling lathe can easily 
turn into a bullet and hit 
the injured person. 
Implement 5S management to ensure all 
items are in order and placed in the 
designated place. Organize all items left in 
the workplace in a logical way so that they 
can more easily accomplish tasks. 
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Crane controller 
failure 
Crane brake failure 
Crane spreader out 
of limit 
1. No equipment 
inspection. 
2. Operators do not have 
sufficient safety skills and 
awareness. 
1. The integrity of equipment shall be 
maintained and assisted by equipment 
registration. 
2. Lifting appliances and equipment shall be 
subject to detailed/thorough inspection by a 
qualified person at least every 12 months 
and equipment used for lifting shall be 
subject to inspection at least every 6 
months. 
3. All lifting gear and equipment should be 
visually inspected before use 
The load shall not exceed the dynamic 
and/or static capacity of the lifting 
equipment. 
4. The integrity and stability of the load 
should be checked before hoisting. 
Lifting operations will be carried out in 
accordance with a documented 
management system. 
The machine 
whirled the iron 
filings out 
 
1. Unreasonable selection 
of cutting tools. 
2. Excessive cutting. 
1. Check whether the chip protection 
device and protection net are safe and 
reliable before cutting. 
2. Train operators on how to handle iron 
filings correctly. In the high speed cutting 
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3. The protective device is 
out of order. 
high strength, high toughness metal, must 
take the strip iron filings cutting measures, 
such as: change the Angle of the cutting 
tool, repair and wear groove, select a 
reasonable feed amount; Use coolant to 
flush the iron filings, change the direction of 
iron filings spray. 
3. Special tools such as hooks and brushes 
must be used to remove chips. 
4. Timely observe the iron filings shape and 
movement direction during the cutting 
process, select the safety station, and clean 
up and adjust when necessary. 
5. Wear the labor insurance correctly. Do 
not leave the cuffs and neckline open. 
Chip breaker failure 1. The device exceeds its 
service life 
2. Omission in equipment 
inspection 
Implement equipment and facility life cycle 
management, carry out spot check, 
maintenance, scrap and other processes. 
Organize safety training for operators to 
improve their ability to identify equipment 
risks. 
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4.2.5 DMAIC - Control 
The control stage is the last stage of DMAIC mode, which is the maintenance and 
continuous improvement of DMAIC safety production management. It is extremely important for 
any DMAIC problem-solving project to maintain the stability of improvement, which is the role 
of process management, it helps ensure that the work done with this process is not slowly forgotten.  
The main work in the control stage is to track and evaluate the improvement effect of the 
safe production process and verify it, and at the same time formulate and document the 
improvement measures. When done properly, improvements can be sustained over the long term.  
K-company needs to continuously collect data of key factors affecting the occurrence of 
production accidents and monitor the improvement of safe production process for a long time. 
Establish a standardized work flow, strictly require that the corresponding safety inspection, safety 
preparation and so on should be done before each supply and demand. 
Employees shall be regularly organized to carry out hazard factor identification activities 
and review and summarize the implementation effect of hazard factor identification activities in 
this year. 
During the implementation process, the company shall organize and inspect the 
implementation of incident management report on implementation in the form of thematic 
meetings. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion, and Recommendations 
Through the analysis of the DMAIC process improvement methodology, this thesis 
explores and studies the application of DMAIC management method to safety incident 
management, and mainly obtains the following research results: 
• Created a DMAIC process improvement program for incident management in the safety 
field. 
• In this thesis, the data obtained can be used for quantitative risk analysis through fault tree 
analysis. Based on the failure risk, this thesis proposes a kind of sequencing based on the 
existing data and the basic events affecting the event management with structured 
judgment. This approach enhances the rigor of quantitative risk analysis by focusing on the 
most important factors. 
• A case study was given to illustrate that the focus of FTA and AHP for safety incident 
management was to find out the key factors affecting the safety target by Pareto Chart and 
propose specific improvement schemes, based on the result of the factors, which could 
effectively and quickly solve the safety problem of enterprises. 
Although this thesis has established a DMAIC problem-solving model for the safety 
incident management process of enterprises, but due to the time relationship and the author's own 
limited ability, this model still has some imperfections. 
In the follow-up work, the determination of the key safety factors remains to be improved. 
In addition, further risk analysis is needed to ensure the effectiveness of the plan after the proposed 
safety improvement control measures, so as to ensure that the plan can carry out cyclic control 
improvement of safety incident management. 
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